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Abstract—Multipath communications at the Internet scale
have been a myth for a long time, with no actual protocol
being deployed so that multiple paths could be taken by a
same connection on the way towards an Internet destination.
Recently, the Multipath Transport Control Protocol (MPTCP)
extension was standardized and is undergoing a quick adoption
in many use-cases, from mobile to fixed access networks, from
data-centers to core networks. Among its major benefits – i.e.,
reliability thanks to backup path rerouting; throughput increase
thanks to link aggregation; and confidentiality thanks to harder
capacity to intercept a full connection – the latter has attracted
lower attention. How interesting would it be using MPTCP
to exploit multiple Internet-scale paths hence decreasing the
probability of man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks is a question
to which we try to answer. By analyzing the Autonomous System
(AS) level graph, we identify which countries and regions show
a higher level of robustness against MITM AS-level attacks, for
example due to core cable tapping or route hijacking practices.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Multipath Transport Control Protocol (MPTCP) [1] is
an extension of TCP to concurrently use multiple network
paths for a given connection. Among many proposals to sup-
port these features at the transport layer, it is considered as the
one having attracted the largest interest and deployment [2].
One of the main reason of this success is its incremental
deployability adopted in its design, with the required signaling
reusing transparently existing TCP option features.
In MPTCP, traffic from a source to a destination in an IP net-
work is routed over multiple ‘subflows’ via different network
interfaces and/or TCP ports at the transmitting and/or receiving
end-points. Subflow traffic can then be routed independently in
the network segment. However, besides the usage of multiple
network interfaces at the source or destination, the presence
of load-balancers or multipath proxies [3] along the network
can differentiate the route followed by the subflow packets.
Among the motivations pushed forward in support of
MPTCP, there are (i) bandwidth aggregation, i.e., the increased
network bandwidth offered to a connection; (ii) connection
reliability, i.e., the possibility to use an alternative path in case
of failure along the primary path or at the primary network
interface level; (iii) communication confidentiality, i.e., the
decreased ability for a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacker
to intercept all the traffic of a same connection.
While the first two aspects above have been largely explored
in the last few years, the latter aspect is almost unexplored
to date. In this paper, we report the results of an extensive
measurement campaign aimed at assessing the degree of
confidentiality one can expect using MPTCP. In particular, we
focus on confidentiality from Autonomous System (AS)-level
MITM interception, i.e., looking at the empirical probability
that a single connection can be intercepted by an organization
or an attacker able to capture all the traffic going through an
AS on a given direction (most of Internet communications
being asymmetric). Such attacks can happen either by remote
access to routing devices of an AS or even by Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) route hijacking attacks. In our analysis, we
consider the case of MPTCP traffic source devices using
two edge providers and we compare the obtained results
on a geographical basis, identifying in which countries and
regions MPTCP may grant higher confidentiality with respect
to MITM. An important assumption of our analysis is that
the MPTCP scheduler behavior can be modified so that it
does not look for throughput maximization only, but also
for path diversity exploitation for increased confidentiality, as
investigated in [4].
The paper is organized as follows. Section II gives a
background on MPTCP and related security concerns. In
Section III, we describe our measurement methodology. Sec-
tion IV presents the results. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
We provide in this section the necessary background on the
MultiPath TCP (MPTCP) protocol and on Internet-scale Man-
In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks.
A. MPTCP
MPTCP extends TCP and allows to fragment a data
flow from a single connection into multiple paths (subflows
TCP) [1], [5], as illustrated in Figure 1. At the application
layer, a connection appears as a normal TCP connection. At
the network layer, each subflow looks like a regular TCP flow
whose segments carry in their header a new type of TCP
option [1]. The protocol improves the performance offered by
a single flow and makes the connection more reliable using
concurrent and redundant paths.
MPTCP employs a 4-tuple composed of source IP address,
source port, destination IP address and destination port to
identify the different subflows [1]. MPTCP manages the
creation, removal and utilization of the subflows to send data
while the connection is active. An MPTCP connection and
its association with new subflows follow the same three-way-
handshake as for initiating a normal TCP connection. In the
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Fig. 1. Multipath TCP Connection: Overview
first handshake, MPTCP uses a control flag (MP_CAPABLE)
in the option field of the segment header to verify if both end-
hosts support MPTCP and configure the connection. Whether
a remote host does not support the protocol, the connection
seamlessy backwards to a regular TCP signaling.
The MPTCP initial handshake carries additional informa-
tion, such as a cryptographic key employed to authenticate
the end-hosts and set up new subflows [1]. In addition to
the key, the establishment of additional subflow may employ
other exchanged keying material, i.e., a token and random
numbers (nonces), to prevent replay attacks on the authen-
tication method. Further, an additional address identifier may
be employed to identify the source IP address of a packet.
Hence, even if the IP header has been changed by a middlebox
(e.g. NATs, firewalls), end-hosts can unambiguously identify
an address on a host.
MPTCP overcomes some weaknesses inherent to TCP,
achieving (i) a greater throughput, (ii) higher reliability,
and (iii) higher confidentiality for data transmission than its
predecessor. Indeed, a multipath connection can improve the
throughput aggregating bandwidth over different paths by
concurrent data transmission across all available paths. More-
over, a multipath connection can quickly overcome one path
failure by sending data to another available path, increasing
the data delivery reliability [6]. Finally, fragmenting data flow
connection across different subflows makes the flow hijacking
difficult because attackers would need to capture the content
transmitted through both the flows to build the content.
Therefore, MPTCP can provide a greater confidentiality
than a regular TCP transmission if the subflows of a con-
nection are routed on disjoint paths: the higher level of
disjointness, the higher the confidentiality guarantee, and the
higher the robustness against such attacks. The goal of this
paper is to precisely quantify this level of robustness in use-
cases where MPTCP is primarily adopted not to improve
communication performance or reliability, but to improve con-
fidentiality. When addressing this feature, router-disjointness
can be considered as too weak, in particular against AS-level
traffic capturing and routing hijacking. We focus instead on
AS-level disjointness.
B. Internet MITM Attacks
When considering AS level path disjointness, MITM attacks
can be avoided if the disjoint paths bound to physical paths
cannot jointly be accessible to a MITM attacker. In Internet-
scale communications, a MITM attack can happen if the
attacker is able to capture all the traffic going through a same
AS. In practice, this can happen if the attacker has access to
all the traffic transiting through an AS, or at least a portion
of it good enough to capture traffic to or from a given prefix.
This can be possible with optical layer attacks or by BGP
route hijacking MITM attacks.
At the optical layer, it is possible to split cables by using
fiber optical taps, as explained in [7], with a low proba-
bility of being detected if peculiar strategies are adopted
as explained in [8], [9]. Moreover, one can intercept traffic
by exploiting coupling and out-of-the-fiber light propagation
phenomena [10], despite this is particularly challenging when
performing wavelength-division-multiplexing.
At the BGP layer, a MITM attack exploits the natural way
BGP works by stealthily hijacking Internet traffic to modify
or capture it before it reaches the destination. BGP MITM
attacks have been quite deeply studied for about twenty years.
The survey in [11] is a recent one with a detailed description
of such attacks, their effects and defenses [11]. The BGP
MITM attack type has gained special attention in 2008, when
a major provider in central Asia hijacked Youtube traffic
to apply local policies. In the same year, a practical BGP
MITM attack was demonstrated during the DefCon hacker
conference [12]: authors successfully intercepted traffic bound
for the conference network and redirected it to a system they
controlled before routing it back to DefCon.
Multiple such BGP incidents are reported when they are
notable ones [13], [14]; often they are not reported because
they cannot be always detectable, they have a limited scope,
last for a short time, target a precise prefix, etc. A notable
recent attack happened in 2014, when attackers have exploited
such attacks to steal bitcoins [15]: the attackers were able to
inject BGP routes which redirected traffic from Bitcoin miner
nodes to the attackers compromised host. It was estimated that
at least $83,000 worth of Bitcoins, Dogecoins, HoboNickels,
and Worldcoins were stolen over a period of four months.
In [16] a solution to protect end-to-end communications
from MITM attacks is presented; it employs multiple inde-
pendent paths to retrieve self-signed certificates and double-
check security mechanisms during the communication. Despite
it focuses on the routing layer instead of the transport layer,
the work is an example of using multiple end-to-end paths for
improving security.
At the transport layer, the advent of MPTCP has raised new
specification questions and challenges. There are attempts to
verify the security of MPTCP [17], [18]. Also, researchers
have proposed solutions against eavesdropping, in general,
based on cryptography [19]. In [18], authors present an anal-
ysis of residual threats in the MPTCP signaling and propose
fixes. In general, most of the works at the state of the art aim at
either investigating security threats for MPTCP or proposing
solutions for them. It is worth mentioning rising interest in
using MPTCP to further enhance confidentiality when using
Internet over-the-top Virtual Private Networks (VPN) services
such as ToR and OnionCat [20]: MPTCP is used in the
upstream direction from the client to many gateways accessible
via the VPN, on the way to the server, further increasing
the confidentiality level of the connection. Nevertheless, such
practices can have a gain which can be hardly assessed: how
can you ensure the upstream source-destination traffic does
follow disjoint paths, hence decrease MITM efficiency, if not
at the router-level, at the AS level? In this paper, for the first
time at the state of the art as of our knowledge, we attempt at
providing a partial response to such questions.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first give a description on the datasets
used for constructing a representative AS-level graph of In-
ternet, the basis for our analysis. Then, we describe our ap-
proach for computing the number of valid vertex-disjoint paths
between two arbitrary nodes over the AS graphs. Finally, we
detail how we evaluate path diversity at different geographical
scopes. The dataset we employed as well as our scripts are
given in [21] for the sake of reproducibility.
A. Graph construction
The AS-level Internet connectivity graph we used is derived
from two types of data: the AS-level topology data and the
inter-AS relationship data, both made available in [22]. Com-
paring with other resources such as [23] [24], the topological
data from [22] revealed to be more reliable and able to capture
a broadened view of the Internet topology. Indeed, the data
from [22] integrates not only Routeviews data [25], but also
data from other well-known public view resources such as
RIPE RIS [26]. Moreover, [23] uses traceroutes that have
known issues [28] when converting router-level information
into AS-level one.
The inter-AS relationship data from [22] is extracted
monthly from the Cyclops database [27], which adopts the
interference techniques proposed in [28]. The proposed al-
gorithm takes advantages from both BGP data and Internet
eXchange Point (IXP) data, then relying on valley-free routing
analysis [29] to derive the inter-AS relationships. To ensure
the synchronization between topological and relational data
we make use of measurements from the same source.
We extract 2015 data [22] (the latest data set available),
and combine them into a new dataset containing all the AS
links along with their frequency of occurrence and relationship
type. Employing measurements over a long period allows to
capture inter-domain connection dynamics as well as inter-
AS economic relationships. For instance, in one-month period,
only 85% of inter-AS links appear more than 20 days, the
remaining links which have a lower frequency of occurrence
being those used for backup operations or during BGP conver-
gence periods. For the sake of consistency, we removed these
unstable links.
It is worth recalling that, because of BGP policy routing,
Internet routing is asymmetric, hence capturing a full con-
nection would mean capturing both communication directions,
i.e., along both AS paths. However, as already mentioned in
the introduction, we focus on MITM attacks that are able
to capture traffic in one single direction, as client-server
communications are essentially asymmetric.
B. Path diversity computation
The problem of selecting all the paths over a graph that
satisfy given properties is often referred to as policy compliant
path diversity computation in the literature [30] [31]. The gen-
eral problem is to maximize the total number of valid vertex-
disjoint paths in a type-of-relationship (ToR) graph [33], i.e., a
directed graph in which the relationship between two adjacent
vertexes (ASes in our case) is expressed via the direction of
the edge connecting them. A ToR graph is generated from
an original undirected graph integrated with relationship data.
In [30], the path diversity between a specific pair of nodes in
a graph is determined by solving an optimization formulation
that maximizes the number vertex-disjoint paths in the ToR
graph. The shortcoming of such approaches is that their time-
complexity is relatively high hence intractable for a graph as
big as the AS graph.
The AS graph is a scale-free graph [34], i.e., a graph with
a relatively few hubs capturing the majority of the paths. One
of the consequences is that the diameter, i.e., the length of
the longest path among all the shortest paths on a direction
graph, is not too high. However, in the AS graph the best
paths are selected based on a policy routing mechanism that
put before path length other criteria such as local preferences,
oldest route, etc. As a result in the BGP routing table the
average path length (measured in number of AS hops) is not
too low neither as the best path may not be the shortest path,
and it is around 5 ASes as of today [35] (a bit lower in IPv6).
It is well known that searching for paths in a scale-free
graph is a not too complex problem given the reasonable
routing diameter, if one adopts breadth/depth-first search al-
gorithms with a limited depth. Given a pair of source and
destination nodes, s and d, respectively, a graph G(N,A) of
policy compliant paths connecting them is discovered, where
N is the set of nodes and A the set of links. Starting from
the origin s, the breadth-search algorithm we adopt explores
all the adjacent nodes of s; we validate the corresponding
links (s, n) ∈ A if they do not violate the valley-free routing
property [29], and label them with the corresponding inter-AS
relationship. For example, assuming that node s neighbors are
n1, n2, n3, and s is customer (‘c’) of n1, provider (‘p’) of
n2 and peer with n3; the relationships of (s, n1), (s, n2), and
(s, n3) are to be labeled as ‘c2p’, ‘p2c’ and ‘p2p’, respectively.
Then, taking the c-type neighbors among s neighbors (i.e.,
n2), and looking at their neighbors x in turn, those (n2, x)
links are not validated if they are either c2p or p2p because
a customer is not expected to grant transit towards its other
provider(s) to one among its providers, and a customer is not
expected to give access to its peer(s) to its provider(s). For
instance, according to such a valley-free constraint, a valid
path could be represented by the following regular expression
c2p ∗ p2p ∗ p2c∗ [31], in which c2p, p2p and p2c express the
relationship of links along a path.
Such a breath-first path search strategy is iteratively applied
starting from the source, repeated for all the neighbors, neigh-
bors of the neighbors, and so on so forth until the destination
d is reached or the hop distance from the s gets over a given
threshold τ . By defining a proper value of τ we not only limit
the time and space complexity for exploring the graph, but
also ensure not taking into account long paths which should
be avoid in practice by MPTCP schedulers. More importantly,
the major benefit of such a search strategy is that the validity of
a path can be checked in runtime while expanding the graph,
thus removing edges that do not comply with routing policies.
Our search algorithm is presented in detail in Alg. 1.
Algorithm 1: Path Search Algorithm
input : source s, destination d, graph g
output: ValidPathSet
V isitedNode←− ∅
queue.append([s])
while queue not empty do
path←− queue.pop()
v ←− path.LastNode()
if v 6= V isitedNode then
for n ∈ v.NeighborSet do
if n 6= V isitedNode then
if label(v,n)=‘p2c’ then
for x ∈ n.NeighborSet do
if label(n,x)=‘c2p’ or
label(n,x)=‘p2p’ then
g.RemoveEdge(n,x)
end
end
end
end
NewPath←− list(path)
NewPath.append(n)
if n = d then
ValidPathSet.append(NewPath)
end
if length(NewPath) = τ + 1 then
break
end
queue.append(NewPath)
end
VisitedNode.add(v)
end
end
As a result of the path search algorithm, policy compliant
paths connecting source and destination may share common
nodes. To get the final set of vertex-disjoint paths, we run a
simple offline filtering linear algorithm to capture the shortest
disjoint paths. Since the original list of valid paths revealed to
be quite small most of the times, and sorted, the complexity
of such a filtering operation is negligible.
C. Source-destination pairs
The current Internet ecosystem is composed of more than
50 thousands ASes, out of which more than half are stub
ASes, i.e., ASes that are origin or destination only ASes.
About 13% are Tier-3 or small Tier-2 ASes we arbitrary
define in this paper as those appearing at most in the third
from last position and at least penultimate position in BGP
AS paths; we refer to such ASes as ‘edge provider’ ASes,
which can be considered as a good representative set of
national Internet Service Provider (ISPs) ‘eyeball’ ASes (hence
excluding Internet carriers and stub ASes).
In order to determine which communications to cover in
our study, we have to define a target set of source-destination
pairs that address in a reasonable yet arbitrary way the
communications that may be more sensible to communication
privacy. We give a representation of the source-destination
pair selection framework in Figure 2. Our choice of source-
destination pairs is as follows:
• the source is interconnected to two edge providers.
• the destination is not multi-homed, i.e., it is reachable via
a single ISP, the one given by the best BGP path from
each source edge provider.
• the destination belongs to another AS and another country
than the ones of the source.
Besides reducing the number of pairs to a reasonable and
treatable number (requiring about one week of computation),
it is worth noting that, in such a way, we consider one single-
direction communication data: the data we care of is the one
is sent from the source node to the destination node. That is,
under such a path election strategy, we are covering:
1) the case of multi-homed (nomadic) devices uploading to
single-homed server;
2) the case of single-homed (fixed) devices downloading
contents from servers connected to a multi-homed net-
work.
For instance, the first case may be the one of sensors or other
mobile devices (using cellular and/or WiFi and/or IoT protocol
interfaces) uploading to a private cloud storage collected data
(measurements, photos, videos, etc), and the second case may
be the one of a residential user downloading files at home.
Therefore, we are not covering:
• the case of multi-homed (nomadic) devices downloading
from single-homed server;
• the case of single-homed (fixed) devices uploading con-
tents to servers connected to a multi-homed network.
• the case of multi-homed devices communicating with
another multi-homed device;
We do not want to speculate that the latter three cases
are less likely to happen. A dual analysis, quite expensive
computationally, covering these cases may be performed as
well in future works. However, at this stage, we cannot see
intuitive critical-communication use-cases corresponding to
such cases, and we doubt such an extended analysis might
bring additional significant insights.
Fig. 2. Source-destination pair selection process
Let us more precisely describe the source-destination pair
election process. We segment the set of edge providers, E,
in country-specific subsets, Ec, where c ∈ C is a country in
the set of countries C, i.e., E = ∪c∈CEc. We use the AS-to-
country mapping given by the CIDR Report [36]. Overall, for
a given country c˜, the number of source-destination pairs is
therefore equal to:
|Ec˜| × (|Ec˜| − 1)
2
×
∑
c 6=c˜
|Ec| (1)
Doing so, we are targeting a lower bound, pessimistic, anal-
ysis, because we consider only international communications
and we suppose the destination is not multi-homed. The filter
we set on the destination enumeration allows us to target
communications that may need a higher confidentiality due
to their international connotation. Moreover, in this way we
also avoid a huge bias due to the fact that a large majority of
the AS paths available at the national level are not visible in
backbone BGP routing tables such as the Routeviews ones
(typically because of internet exchange points, as recently
shown in [32]). We believe having a lower bound stand is
more appropriate than an upper bound one, while allowing us
to scientifically qualify the value of the relative trends.
Given a source-destination pair, we then calculate the
number of AS-disjoint paths using the path search algorithm
already described, and store this information. In practice, on
the resulting AS-graph (composed of 21469 edge provider
nodes and 86983 edges with an average degree of 4.05), it
takes from 500 ms to 2.5 s to compute the total number
of policy-compliant vertex-disjoint paths for each pair of AS
nodes. Please note that the source node is not considered as
an AS node of the AS graph; therefore, in the measurement
results that follow we distinguish between the view point of
the source node from the view point of its providers.
IV. RESULTS
We report the results obtained for a set of 147 countries,
i.e., those countries from the United Nations statistics [37] that
have at least two distinct edge providers officially based in the
country (this excludes Greenland territories, very small city-
state countries and many African and Indonesian countries).
The geographical coverage is given in Figure 3.
We proceed as follows.
• For each country, we generate all possible dual-homed
source configurations, i.e., all possible pairs of edge
providers. Figure 4 reports the distribution of the number
of source pairs for each countries.
• For each source configuration (i.e., for each pair of edge
providers), we compute the number of disjoint paths to
each destination. Figure 5 reports the distribution of the
number of destinations for each source country.
• MITM robustness metric: for a given source, we define it
as the average of the number of disjoint paths over all the
destinations: such metric can be considered as a level of
unlikelihood that a MinM attack can take place for that
source configuration; the higher the value of the MITM
metric, the more difficult is for an attacker to capture
traffic from that country.
• For each country, a series of MITM robustness metrics,
one for each source, is therefore created.
We characterize the resulting series using boxplot (mini-
mum, quantiles, maximum, and 0.1% outliers) distribution.
Figures 4 and 5 show that the three countries with the highest
number of source configurations (i.e., those with the highest
number of edge provider pairs), e.g., Brazil, US and Russia
have also the lowest size of the destination set, which is
reasonable given (1), while guaranteeing a largely sufficient
statistical significance (thousands of entries for each country).
We overlay over the boxplots the average of the corresponding
series (red square). The results are then ordered from left to
right with increasing averages.
Results are shown in Figure 6 and depicted on the world
map in Figure 3. We report three types of results:
(a) device view
(b) edge provider view
Fig. 3. Countries covered with corresponding MITM robustness distribution.
Fig. 4. Number of source configurations per country
Fig. 5. Size of the destination set per country
• For Figure 6a, the MITM robustness is computed with the
source node integrated as a node in the AS graph as an
artificial node, i.e., it provides a device view; obviously,
in this view the upper bound of the robustness is 2, i.e.,
the number of edge providers used by the source.
• For Figure 6b, the MITM robustness is computed instead
summing the number of disjoint paths from the first edge
provider to those from the second edge provider, then
decreased by those paths that do share an AS hop, i.e.,
it provides an edge provider view; when higher than 1
for a given edge provider, our assumption when counting
the robustness metric is that the additional paths from the
edge provider can be made available to MPTCP subflows
by forms of load-balancing.
• For Figure 6c, we report the differential robustness re-
sults, i.e., the edge provider view robustness minus the
device view robustness, computed for each source config-
uration individually. This view more precisely quantifies
the gain achievable for MPTCP communications in case
of inter-AS load-balancing at the edge providers.
That is, while Figure 6b assumes MITM attacks do not
happen at the source and destination edge providers (i.e., there
is a high level of trust on those edge providers), Figure 6a
assumes that MITM attacks can happen at the source edge
providers, hence revealing a low level of trust in source
direct providers. Figure 6c can be interpreted as the marginal
gain to consider when adopting (for the provider) or using
(for the user) inter-AS load-balancing features at the edge
provider (or over-the-top VPN) level. It is worth noting that
Figure 6a may also better represent the case of single-homed
client downloading from multi-homed server discussed in
Section III-C, in which case server direct providers are not
the client direct providers and thus can be less trusted ones.
As a general assessment, Figures 6 show that, considering
1.5 average as the rough threshold making the likelihood of
MITM negative if higher than it, positive is lower than it,
only about 5% of the countries show good chances of being
robust against MITM from a device view, while looking at the
maximum instead of the average and median values one could
speculate that careful choice of the edge providers could make
this likelihood positive for a majority of the countries. From
a, edge provider view this ratio grows to roughly 60%, and
higher than 90% if the edge provider choice is influenced by
confidentiality concerns.
Moreover, the average number of paths connecting a dual-
home node to international destinations has a significant vari-
ance depending on the source country. The average robustness
ranges from 1 and less to 1.6 from a device view, and from 1
(and less) to 2.5 from an edge provider view. Some minimum
and even average values are below 1 because of the partial
view of Internet topology and the incompleteness of inter-
AS relationship interference, which make some destinations
unreachable via the ToR graph (hence counted as 0 paths);
we left it as is to also give an index of the level of the ToR
graph incompleteness for different countries. In any case, the
boxplot median is a metric robust against such outliers to look
at.
In addition, observing the plots in Figure 6, we can also
remark that:
• Within a country, a high inter-quantile range (between
the first and the third quantiles) indicates that the path
diversity strongly depends on how the two upstream edge
providers are selected for the source.
• The median is mostly higher than the average in the
device view, and lower than the average in the edge
provider view. This is essentially due to outliers, counted
in the average and not in the median.
• The gap between the min and max robustness is another
interesting fitness metric to observe. Some countries
maintain a small gap (below 1) while others have a
very big gap (up to 2). In other words, the deployment
of MPTCP for securing international communications
in some countries can statistically yield a much better
result than in other countries, where this gap is smaller.
Particularly interesting is the case of Angola (AO),
Venezuela (VE) and Namibia (NA), with small robustness
gap, which may be correlated to the presence of inter-
continental cables landing at or close to the country [38].
• In the edge provider view, the maximum value is higher
than 2 in the majority of the countries: this behavior
suggests that with a proper choice of trusted upstream
providers for the source, communicating nodes can adopt
MPTCP to statistically expect high confidentiality for
their communications regardless. Particularly alerting are
the cases of Uzbekistan (UZ), Nepal (NP) and Lebanon
(LB), with quite low maximum value.
(a) device view
(b) edge provider view
(c) differential robustness view
Fig. 6. MITM robustness distribution for 147 countries.
• In the device view, in the majority of the cases the
maximum robustness is not higher than 1.6, both averages
and medians are quite far from the desirable target of
2. Hence, without the support of inter-AS load-balancing
(such as with BGP or LISP protocols), path diversity from
a dual-homed node is reduced significantly, indicating a
non negligible probability of paths joining on the way to
the destination.
• Looking at the differential robustness, we can remark that
among the countries that have the lowest device view
MITM robustness, those that could the most benefit from
inter-AS load-balancing practices are Mongolia (MN),
Pakistan (PK) and Korea (KR). However, most of those
with low robustness do not improve much the situation
with respect to the device view.
Looking at macro geographical regions, many European
countries seem to grant better security than countries in other
regions. In order to look after continental characteristics, the
plots in Figure 7 show the boxplot results (with 1% outliers)
aggregated on a macro-region basis (a and c, sub-continental
level) and on a relative position basis (b and d, in terms of
seacoast and inland borders). We can remark that:
• Western Europe appears as the best off, followed by
Northern Europe and Northern America. In almost 50%
of Western Europe countries there can be 2 disjoint paths
from the source edge providers to Internet destinations.
• Central Asia shows the worst robustness, followed by
Australia and New Zealand; the reasons are likely net-
work centralization practices and geographical isolation.
It is interesting to notice the relevant gap between Central
and South-Eastern/Western Asia.
• A high variance is recorded at Southern Asia, Northern
Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa, which indicates high
differences among the countries within these areas.
• We could not find strong correlation between the relative
continental position, and the robustness metric, yet a pos-
itive correlation exists, with countries at the boundaries
of oceans, with inter-continental cable landing and that
are sea-oriented (most of the border on the sea-side) that
offer higher robustness than fully internal and continental-
oriented ones.
(a) device view: macro-regions grouping (b) position grouping
(c) edge provider view: macro-regions grouping (d) position grouping
Fig. 7. MITM robustness metric with aggregated country groups.
V. APPLICATION SCOPES
We focused our study on MPTCP-based communications.
More precisely, our study cover the following cases:
• MPTCP capable end-points: both source and destination,
client and server (or viceversa) end-points, are MPTCP
capable, and the MPTCP communication is not filtered
by middle-boxes. As argued in Section III-C, the multi-
homed end-point can be either the server or the client.
• MPTCP proxied end-points: at least one end-point is not
MPTCP capable, but its (their) TCP communications is
(are) handled by MPTCP proxie(s), converting TCP pack-
ets into MPTCP packets and/or viceversa, as explained
in [3], [39], possibly routed via Internet disjoint paths as
proposed in [40], [41]. The multipath conversion proxies
(i.e., aggregation and concentrator nodes) can sit at end-
point premises (customer premises equipment for the
client node, hypervisor or middle-box at the server side)
or at the edge provider level borders.
Moreover, besides MPTCP-based communications, other
protocols offering Internet-scale multipath load-balancing
could also be covered by this study. The following protocols
are either not deployed, or they have undergone only a limited
deployment so far; they are:
• SCTP: the Stream-Control-Protocol (SCTP) [48] is an-
other multipath transport protocol absolving the same
function than MPTCP, but less deployed than MPTCP
due to the limited retrocompatibility.
• LISP: the Locator/Identifier Separation Protocol
(LISP) [47] is able to perform inter-AS inbound load-
balancing by means of encapsulation, routing locator
mapping, and appropriate traffic engineering policy
configuration. LISP primary scope is the edge provider
one, hence results with the edge provider view readily
apply to LISP traffic engineering. It is worth noting that,
deployment of LISP as an intra-AS TE tool can also
allow performing inter-AS multipath on the outbound
direction as proposed in [43].
• MultiPath BGP: in BGP, when some higher BGP decision
criteria are equivalent, even if the load might technically
be balanced on the equivalent routes, only one route is
retained using lower-level criteria (that can be inefficient
ones in terms of global routing such as hot-potato or
tie-breaking rules). However, forms of Multipath BGP
were discussed in standardization fora, but finally not
standardized; however, some recommendations have been
published [44], and some vendors implement it (see,
e.g., [45] and [46]). Such multipath BGP mode can be
adopted at the edge provider scope as for LISP, but
instead than on the inbound direction as LISP, multipath
BGP applies to the egress load-balancing direction. De-
spite the study [42] on BGP core routing tables report
that in 2010 multipath BGP was practically not used,
speculations report it is used by major cloud providers.
The above protocols are a selection of those protocol com-
munication contexts where load-balancing can have a direct
effect on the AS path selection. Nevertheless, other load-
balancing protocols can potentially have an impact on the
egress AS selection as well, as for instance in data-center
environments. In the case of MPTCP communications, these
protocols, operated at the edge provider view, are able to
perform inter-AS load-balancing in such a way that the path
diversity exposed in the edge provider view in our analysis can
be made available to MPTCP devices subflows, hence given
them the full potential of MPTCP in terms of communication
confidentiality and robustness against MITM attacks.
VI. CONCLUSION
We explored in this paper how Internet path diversity
could be exploited by means of multi-path transport protocols
when looking at increased security against man-in-the-middle
attacks. We focused in particular on such attacks acting at
the Internet network autonomous system level, and at the
robustness of MPTCP communications in what appear as
a reasonable configuration where at least one among the
endpoints is multi-homed with two edge providers.
We reported extensive specific and aggregated results for
most of the world countries and regions, looking at macro
trends that could inspire further research in the area. Results
show that, statistically speaking, MPTCP does not help in
guaranteeing robustness against MITM attacks hence high
confidentiality, unless the choice of the edge provider is
carefully taken, or one can rely on inter-AS load-balancing fea-
tures offered implicitly or explicitly by edge providers. Some
continental regions are strongly more robust than others, and
there seems to be a positive correlation with inter-continental
cable landing proximity. Moreover, the results show that there
are countries surprisingly less well connected than one could
think of and countries that are more obviously less robust
against such attacks due to network centralization practices.
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